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ABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence for the existence of a wage curve -- a micro-econometric association
between the level of pay and the local unemployment rate -- in modern U.S. data. Consistent with
recent evidence from more than 40 other countries, the wage curve in the United States has a long-
run elasticity of approximately  ￿0.1. In line with the paper’’s theoretical framework: (i) wages are
higher in states with more generous unemployment benefits, (ii) the perceived probability of job-
finding is lower in states with higher unemployment, and (iii) employees are less happy in states that






















One of the oldest empirical questions in economics is that of how the price of labor is affected by 
the  unemployment  rate.    Following  a  tradition  begun  by  the  New  Zealand  economist  A.W. 
Phillips (1958), this question has traditionally been studied with aggregate time-series methods.  
Although its robustness is still debated, the Phillips Curve, which is usually conceived of as a 
relationship  between  wage  growth  and  unemployment,  has  become  part  of  standard 
macroeconomics. 
 
Blanchflower and Oswald (in, for example, 1994a) argue instead for the use of microeconomic 
data.1  Their book documents the existence of a logarithmic curve linking the level of pay to the 
unemployment rate in the local area.  Its conclusion is that, in sixteen nations, including the 
United States, the data are well described by a wage curve with an unemployment elasticity of 
approximately –0.1.2  A doubling of the unemployment rate is then associated with a ten percent 
decline in the level of the (real) wage.  This is presented in the book as an empirical law of 
economics.  
 
Since then, Blanchflower and Oswald’s conclusions have been scrutinized by other researchers.  
The wage-curve finding has now been replicated for more than 40 nations.  Its existence in the 
United States, however, is still viewed as controversial.   
 
One reason is that Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue for a Phillips Curve, rather than a wage 
curve, in United States data. Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002) and Card and Hyslop (1997) also 
report a high level of auto-regression in U.S. wages.  In contrast, Hines, Hoynes and Krueger 
(2001) conclude that a wage curve specification has a more natural theoretical interpretation and 
fits the data (hours as well as wages) better than the Phillips Curve specification.  Hines et al 
(2001) produce evidence of wage curves using annual and hourly earnings from the 1977-2000 
March CPS files.  The authors also uncover wage curves in the PSID for male household heads 
aged 25-59 who were continuously employed for 1967-1987 and 1977-1996. Using the PSID, 
Hines et al suggest that a 3 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate is associated with 
a 4 per cent increase in real wages, which translates into an elasticity similar to the Blanchflower-
Oswald number. 
 
In principle, the wage curve should be as interesting to macroeconomists as to labor economists.  
Yet  the  empirical  results  on  the  wage  curve’s  existence  have  so  far  made  relatively  little 
impression on American macroeconomics.  This does not seem ideal.  First, macroeconomic 
analysis has for some decades stressed the need for microeconomic foundations.  It might be 
                     
1 See also Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 2000). 
 
2 In Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) we used micro-data for twelve countries: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, West Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, South Korea, Norway, Ireland, Italy, Canada and 
Australia.  The book also discussed evidence based on other researchers' work in a further four countries - Sweden, 





natural to expect such strictures to apply empirically as well as theoretically.  Second, some 
macroeconomics  textbooks,  including  Blanchard  (2003),  make  extensive  theoretical  use  of  a 
wage curve (at the aggregate level, which he refers to as a ‘wage-setting’ relation), but do not lay 
out the evidence for such a curve.3  Third, the idea of viewing different US states as usefully 
different mini laboratories for study -- effectively what chapter 4 of Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994a) proposes -- has become conventional in various areas of economics. 
 
Reconsidering the evidence 
 
The literature on international wage curves is now so large that the case of the United States is 
becoming increasingly anomalous.  It needs to be reconsidered.   
 
Subsequent to the publication of the Blanchflower-Oswald book 4, wage curves were reported for 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, 
China, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, East Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Great 
Britain/UK,  Holland,  Hungary,  India,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Latvia,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russia,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  South  Africa,  South  Korea,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, USA, and West Germany.  The list below provides a 
summary. 
 
Wage Curves in the Research Literature  
 
1. Argentina  Galiani (1999). 
2. Australia  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a); Kennedy and Borland (2000). 
3. Austria  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (2000); Winter-Ebmer (1996). 
4. Belarus  Pastore and Verashchagina (2004). 
5. Belgium  Janssens and Konings (1998). 
6. Brazil  Amadeo and Camargo (1997); Barros and Mendonca (1994). 
7. Bulgaria   Blanchflower (2001); Iara and Traistaru (2004). 
8. Burkina Faso  Lachaud (1998). 
9. Canada  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (2000); Fares (2002); Leung (1997). 
10. Chile  Berg and Contreras (2004). 
11. China  Wu (2004); Sabin (1999). 
12. Côte d'Ivoire  Hoddinott (1996). 
13. Czech Republic  Blanchflower (2001); Huitfeldt (2001); Galušcák and Münich (2002). 
14. Denmark  Nicolaisen and Tranaes (1996). 
15. East Germany  Blanchflower (2001); Baltagi, Blien and Wolf (2000); Buscher (2003); 
   Elhorst, Blien and Wolf (2002); Pannenberg and Schwarz (1996). 
16. Estonia  Blanchflower (2001). 
                     
3 Blanchard (2003), pp. 126-128 and 273-275. 
 
4 There have also been various theoretical contributions, including Campbell and Orszag (1998), Johansen (1997), 
Knight (1998), Ma (2004), Mankiw and Reis (2003), Roberts (1997), Sato (2000), Sessions (1993) and Whelan 
(1997).  Some papers, such as Guichard and Laffargue (2000), now use the term ‘wage curve’ when looking at the 
macroeconomic effects of unemployment within a panel of countries; but we try here to reserve the term for micro-





17. Finland  Pekkarinen (2001). 
18. France  Montuenga et al (2003); Estevao and Nargis (2001); Gianella (2002); 
  Glaude and L’Héritier (1993), Delteil et al (2004). 
19. Great Britain/  Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) (1994a) (1994b) (2000); Montuenga et 
    United Kingdom  al (2003); Bell, Nickell and Quintini (2002); Blackaby and Hunt (1992); 
   Black and Fitzroy (2000); Barth et al (2002a, b); Collier (2001). 
20. Hungary   Blanchflower (2001); Kollo (1998); Kertesi and Kollo (1997) (1999); 
  Delteil et al (2004). 
21. India  Bhalotra (1993). 
22. Ireland  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a). 
23. Italy  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (2000); Montuenga et al (2003);  
  Chiarini and Piselli (1997); Canziani (1997). 
24. Japan  Rebick (1993); Montgomery (1994); Kano (2003). 
25. Latvia  Blanchflower (2001); Adaimate (2001). 
26. Netherlands  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (2000); Groot et al (1992); Graafland 
  (1992). 
27. New Zealand  Papps (2001); Morrisson and Poot (1999). 
28. Norway  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (2000); Johansen (1995) (1999); Falch 
  (2001); Bardsen et al (2004); Brunstad and Dyrstad (1997); Dyrstad and 
  Johanssen (2000); Wulfsberg (1997); Johansen et al (2001); Barth et al 
  (2002a, b). 
29. Poland   Blanchflower (2001); Iara and Traistaru (2004); Duffy and Walsh (2000)  
  (2002); Basu et al (1995). 
30. Portugal  Montuenga et al (2003). 
31. Romania  Kallai and Traistaru (2001). 
32. Russia  Blanchflower (2001). 
33. Slovakia  Blanchflower (2001); Basu et al (1995) (2000); Huitfeldt (2001). 
34. Slovenia  Simoncic and Pfajfar (2004). 
35. South Africa   Kingdon and Knight (1998). 
36. South Korea  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a). 
37. Spain  Garcia-Mainar and Montuenga-Gomez (2003); Jimeno and Bentolila 
  (1998); Canziani (1997); Sanromá and Ramos (2003); Bajo et al (1999). 
38. Sweden   Holmlund and Skedinger (1990); Edin and Holmlund (1989); Edin, 
  Holmlund and Ostros (1994). 
39. Switzerland   Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (2000). 
40. Taiwan  Rodgers and Nataraj (1999). 
41. Turkey  Ilkkaracan and Raziye (2003). 
42. USA  Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) (1993) (1994a) (1995) (1996) (2000); 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996); Blanchard and Katz (1997); 
Card (1995); Bratsberg and Turunen (1996); Deller  and Tsai (1998); 
Deller and Zhing (2003); Boushey (2002); Turunen (1998); Barth et al 
(2002a, b); Bertrand (2004); Hines, Hoynes and Krueger (2001); Bartik 
(2000). 
43. West Germany  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) (1996); Bellmann and Blien (2001); 




(2004); Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998); Blien (2003); Rendtel and 
Schwarze (1996); Baltagi et al (2000). 
 
What can be learned from this work?  Although inevitably imperfect, the statistical law of a wage 
curve with an elasticity of –0.1 has turned out to fit the data surprisingly well.5  Interestingly, 
results for the Scandinavian countries emerge somewhat below the -0.1 estimate (e.g. Pekkarinen 
(2001); Brunstad and Dyrstad (1997); Holmlund and Skedinger (1990)).  There is also evidence 
from one or two of the former communist countries of an elasticity far above the -0.1 estimate 
(e.g.  Blanchflower  (2001);  Pastore  and  Verashchagina  (2004);  and  Pannenberg  and  Schwarz 
(1998)) although other papers for these countries do find numbers close to -0.1 (such as Kertesi 
and Kollo (1997, 1999); Duffy and Walsh (2002); Elhorst et al. (2002); and Kallai and Traistaru 
(2001)).  
 
A recent meta-analysis -- on a sample of 208 wage/unemployment wage curve elasticities from 
the literature -- by Nijkamp and Poot (2005) concludes that  
 
"the wage curve is a robust empirical phenomenon … but there is … evidence of 
publication bias.  There is indeed an uncorrected mean estimate of about -0.1 for 
the  elasticity.    After  controlling  for  publication  bias  by  means  of  two  different 
methods, we estimate that the 'true' wage curve elasticity at the means of study 
characteristics is about -0.07".  
 
Nijkamp  and  Poot  (2005)  also  test  for,  and  find  no  evidence  of,  what  they  term  a 
Blanchflower/Oswald 'advocacy' effect. 
 
Most economists are unlikely to feel strongly about the possible difference between a wage curve 
elasticity estimate of -0.07 and one of -0.1.  What matters more is whether there are countries in 
which a wage curve cannot reliably be found.  Here the case of the United States needs to be 
confronted.   
 
2. The Data Reloaded 
 
Is there, or is there not, a U.S. wage curve?  Given that wage curves have been found for many 
dozens of other nations, it would be remarkable, and presumably important, if the same were not 
true in the United States.  
 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to study the patterns in modern American data.  We re-
estimate the U.S. wage curve on a state level panel using CPS data from 1980-2001.  We explore 
points made by Blanchard and Katz (1997). 
 
                     
5 On page 357 of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) it is argued that: 
 
"Future work will have to begin to test for statistically significant differences among numbers that 
lie in a rough band from -0.05 to -0.20.  It would probably be unwise to treat the minus-point-one 





The paper tests explicitly for the effect of unemployment upon wages and does not discuss the 
possible structure of a classical labor-supply function.  This is because: first, the paper takes the 
efficiency-wage  theory  as  its  maintained  hypothesis  and  in  such  a  framework  a  no-shirking 
condition  replaces  the  labor  supply  curve;  second,  the  paper  aims  to  be  consistent  with  the 
literature on Phillips Curves and wage curves; third, in other results not reported here we have 
found that unemployment variables enter wage equations more strongly than do employment-rate 
variables.        
 
Overall, our results suggest that the United States has more autoregression in pay than many 
nations, but that there is much evidence of a U.S. wage curve.  This has implications that seem to 
matter.  It means, first, that US labor markets may not be fundamentally different from other 
nations’  labor  markets  (contrary  to  what  has  sometimes  been  claimed),  and,  second,  that 
American macroeconomists who use the Phillips Curve in modeling might wish to work more 
with micro data.   
 
With  the  advantage  of  hindsight,  our  1994  book  failed  to  examine  sufficiently  carefully  the 
autoregressive nature of hourly pay in the United States.  
 
Any labor economist would argue that wages and unemployment are simultaneously determined.  
Within the wage-curve debate, therefore, issues of identification and measurement will matter.  
Moreover, given that wages are famously sticky, it is unlikely that it will be straightforward to 
distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on pay.  Wage dynamics can be expected to 
play a central role.   
 
Put informally, four views are visible in the economics literature. 
 
Idea 1 (Phillips).  The rate of growth of pay is inversely related to the unemployment rate.  This 
hypothesis is explored in Phillips' 1958 Economica paper.  He used a long run of aggregate time 
series data for Britain.  The idea of a function dw/dt = f(U) is not necessarily a-theoretical.  It can 
be justified by appealing to the notion that excess supply of a commodity gradually pushes down 
the price of that commodity.  Here f(.) has a negative gradient.  But Phillips was not clear about 
whether any relationship was to be expected between the level of wages, w, and unemployment, 
U.  Sargan (1964) was later to argue a version of that. 
 
Idea 2 (Harris-Todaro) To take a job in a region or industry (or in principle even a country) that 
experiences  a  lot  of  unemployment,  the  typical  worker  needs  to  be  paid  well.    This  is  an 
application  of  the  concept  of  compensating  differentials.    A  state  like  West  Virginia,  which 
traditionally  has  had  one  of  the  highest  rates  of  joblessness  in  the  United  States,  should  in 
equilibrium offer better pay than one with persistently low unemployment.  Otherwise workers 
will find life too risky to stay.  At the region or industry level, therefore, w = g(U).  Here the 
function g(.) will have a positive gradient. 
 
Idea 3 (The wage curve).  In most countries, it has been found, following Blanchflower and 
Oswald, that regions with higher unemployment have lower wages.  One way to rationalize such 
a discovery is to appeal to non-competitive theories of the labor market – for example to the idea 




framework, higher local unemployment makes life tougher for workers (for example, they will 
find  it  harder  to  obtain  work  if  laid  off  by  their  current  employer),  and  therefore  it  is  not 
necessary for employers to remunerate those individuals so well.  Here w = h(U), and the h(.) 
function has a negative gradient. 
 
Idea 4 (Labor demand and supply).  If unemployment can in some circumstances be viewed as 
the  negative  of  employment,  an  observed  function  w  =  j(U)  might  be  construed  as  a  labor 
demand or supply function.  This logic might be thought to be a stretch, because labor demand 
and supply theory is not typically framed in unemployment space.  Nevertheless, a function w = 
j(U) might be seen as some kind of demand or supply curve written in mild disguise.  If j(U) is a 
miss-specified labor supply function, for example, it might be argued that j(U) would have a 
negative gradient.  If it is a miss-specified demand function, it might be expected to have a 
positive gradient. 
 
Among these four views, there is currently disagreement, and perhaps even confusion, in labor 
economics and macroeconomics.  We think the current position is this. The average US labor 
economist believes in Harris-Todaro and, with a bit of skepticism along the way about the nature 
of macroeconomic data, also believes in some form of Phillips Curve.  The average European 
labour economist does not believe in Harris-Todaro and, with a bit more respect along the way 
for macroeconomic data, believes in some form of wage curve.   
 
Recent  debate  has  probably  been  hampered  by  a  tendency  for  researchers  to  concentrate  on 
extremes.    Some  commentators,  for  example,  interpret  Blanchflower  and  Oswald (1994a) as 
arguing for a necessarily static wage curve without any autoregression in wages (although the 
book  includes  estimated  equations  with  lags  on  the  dependent  variable).    Similarly,  because 
Phillips’s original article does not discuss the possibility of dynamics other than a unit root in the 
pay equation, the macroeconomics literature has been dominated by simple functional forms.  
 
We aim to find common ground between disagreements in Blanchard and Katz (1997, 1999), 
Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002), Card and Hyslop (1997), Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a), 
Bell, Nickell and Quintini (2002), Barth et al (2002a, b), and Fares (2002). 
 
3. A theoretical framework 
 
If  wages  and  unemployment  are  simultaneously  determined,  how  should  we  think about  the 
spatial patterns in pay and joblessness?  A model favored by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) 
draws on efficiency wage theory.  An illustrative version is as follows. 
 
Consider an economy consisting of just two regions.  The following assumptions are made about 
region 1 and, with small modifications, also about region 2. 
 
A1 Assume that workers are risk-neutral.  They get utility from income and disutility from effort.  
Define the wage as w and the level of on-the-job effort as e.  Assume that a worker’s utility 





A2  Assume  that  effort  at  work,  e,  is  a  fixed  number  determined  by  technology,  but  that 
individual employees can decide to "shirk" and exert zero effort.  If undetected by the firm, these 
individuals earn wage w and have e = 0, so that u = w.  They are then better off than employees 
who provide effort. 
 
A3 An individual who shirks runs the risk of being detected.  Designate as d  the probability of 
successfully shirking, that is, of escaping detection.  Assume that anyone caught shirking is fired, 
and has then to find work elsewhere (at required effort e).  Let the expected utility of a fired 
worker be w .  Define it  
 
w = (w – e)￿(U) + b[1 – ￿(U)].                  (1) 
 
This is a convex combination of w – e, the utility from working at the required effort level, and 
of b, which is defined as the income value of unemployment benefit plus leisure.  The function  
￿(U) measures the probability of finding work, and how that is affected by the level of 
unemployment, U, prevailing in the local labor market. 
 
A4 Assume that there is a constant rate of break-up, r, of firms.  In steady-state equilibrium, total 
new hires in the local economy are ￿[L – n] where L is working population and n is employment, 
and rn = ￿[L – n]. 
 
Unemployment is by definition U ￿ 1 – 
L
n





This implicitly defines a function ￿(U) where the first derivative is negative and the second 
derivative  is  positive.   Thus the probability of finding a job, ￿, is a convex function of the 
unemployment rate, U. 
 
A5 Equivalent equations hold in the second region. 
 
A6 However, the second region differs from the first in that both workers and non-workers enjoy 
a non-pecuniary benefit, ø, from living in the region.  
 
A7 Each region is affected by shocks to the demand for labor.  The shock variable is denoted s in 
region 1, with a density function g(s).  There is an equivalent shock variable in region 2, with 
density h(.).  These shocks could be thought of as exogenous movements in real input prices, but 
other interpretations are possible. 
 
A8 Workers are free, between periods, to choose to live in whichever region they prefer.  They 
cannot migrate during a period. 
 
The  assumptions  given  above  describe  a  form  of  efficiency-wage  model.    The  model’s  key 
characteristic is that employers must pay a wage that is sufficiently high to induce employees not 
to shirk.  In equilibrium, workers must be behaving optimally in their effort decisions, and firms 
must  be  behaving  optimally  in  their  wage-setting.    Regions  differ  in  their  non-pecuniary 




however, each region must offer workers the same level of expected utility.  This condition 
defines a zero-migration equilibrium. 
 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) show that the following result can be proved. 
 
Proposition 1:  Each region has a downward-sloping convex wage curve.  If regions have the 
same level of unemployment benefit, they have a common wage curve given by the equation  
 
w = b + e +





                 (2) 
 
The convexity of the wage curve follows from the convexity of the ￿(U) function, and can be 
checked  by  differentiation.    Intuitively,  as  unemployment  U  rises,  firms  realize  that  their 
employees  are  inherently  more  frightened  of  losing  their  jobs,  and  can  pay  lower  levels  of 
remuneration while maintaining the necessary degree of worker effort.  A corollary is: 
 
Proposition 2:  There is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.  
 
The  details  of  the  proofs,  and  other  associated  corollaries,  are  given  on  pages  66-69  of 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a). 
 
4. Empirical Issues 
 
In this paper we attempt to implement empirically a version of Equation 2.   
 
First, a logarithmic wage equation is estimated.  This is not essential but follows convention in 
the labor literature.  Second, we test for the influence of unemployment benefits, b, within a wage 
equation.  Although it follows directly from the theory, we have been unable to find a literature 
on testing for the effects of benefit levels in regional or state-level wage equations.  The previous 
wage-curve literature has been unable to do so, but in US data it is possible to use information on 
state unemployment insurance payments to construct a value for the b variable across space.  If 
information on b is not available, it might be argued, as in Blanchard and Katz (1999), that the 
coefficient on any lagged dependent variable will be biased.  Third, following the previous wage-
curve literature, the nonlinear function embedded within equation 2 is approximated empirically 
by  a  logarithmic  function  of  unemployment,  U.    This  is  primarily  for  simplicity.    Fourth, 
equations are estimated with a lagged dependent variable (that is, a regressor wt-1).  This is to 
measure the degree of autoregression in pay, and to allow a direct check for pure Phillips Curve 
specifications.    Fifth,  implicit  in  the  analysis  will  be  the  assumption  that  joblessness  makes 
people unhappy, that is, that unemployment benefits b do not make up sufficiently for the drop in 
utility upon loss of a job; this is consistent with empirical evidence on psychological wellbeing, 
such as that in Clark and Oswald (1994). 
 
Identification issues have to be addressed.  Here the form of wage equation makes it natural to 
use benefits b as an instrument for wages w.  To complete the model, an unemployment equation 




curve for labor, and use two lags on U as instruments for unemployment.  Later in the paper we 
estimate this function Ut = ￿(Ut-1, Ut-2, wt, controls) directly.   
 
The paper begins with simple wage equations.  They are estimated using state-year weighted 
averages based on the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files of the Current Population Survey.  
The data cover the years 1979-2001.    The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings in 
each state-year cell.  Hourly earnings are calculated as earnings per week divided by usual hours.  
Top-coded earnings are multiplied by 1.5.  Weights are used to calculate state-year cell averages 
for the independent and dependent variables. 
 
There is a potential difficulty with the ORG earnings or wage data.  Hirsch and Schumacher 
(2004)  have  pointed  out  that  over  30  per  cent  of  workers  in  the  ORG  data  files  have  their 
earnings  imputed  using  a  "cell  hot  deck"  method.    The  authors  argue  that  this  can  create 
downward biases when the attribute being studied (e.g. union status) is not a criterion used in the 
imputation itself.  In addition, there will be biases in other variables, such as schooling, where we 
understand only a limited number of controls (4) get used for the imputation even though sixteen 
education categories are available.   
 
Furthermore, the proportions of the wage data that are imputed have increased in importance 
since a sample redesign of the CPS in 1993.6  Unfortunately, it is not a simple matter to exclude -
- in a way consistent over time -- the individuals who have imputed earnings.  If past values of 
wages and/or other variables in a state are used to impute current wage values (as we understand 
is  the  case),  this  is  likely  to  bias  upwards  the  coefficient  on  the  lagged  dependent  variable 
whenever the imputed observations are included.  In other words, this would tend to distort 
research towards finding a Phillips curve. 
 
We attempt to make an adjustment for this problem.  We exclude the ‘imputed’ earners in all 
years except for 1994 and 1995.  In those years it is not possible to make sample exclusions 
because allocation flags are unavailable in 1994 and only for a third of the months in 1995 
(September-December).  Allocation flags appear to be unreliable for 1989-93, moreover, when 
the  proportion  of  earnings  that  were  allocated  mysteriously  drops  from  14.4%  in  1988  to 
approximately 4% for the five years.  A significant number of individuals in 1989-1993 had 
                     
6 The numbers of wage observations followed by the percentage imputed in parentheses (hourly + non-hourly paid) 
in the NBER MORG are given below based on the variable I25d.  In 1995 the allocation information is only 
available on one-third of wage observations -- hence the small sample.   In 1994 it is not possible to identify any 
individuals with imputed earnings. 
 
1979 171,745 (16.5%)   1988 173,118 (14.4%)  1997 154,955 (22.2%) 
1980 199,469 (15.8%)   1989 176,411 (3.7%)    1998 156,990 (23.6%) 
1981 186,923 (15.2%)  1990 185,030 (3.9%)   1999 159,362 (27.6%) 
1982 175,797 (13.7%)   1991 179,560 (4.4%)   2000 161,126 (29.8%) 
1983 173,932 (13.8%)   1992 176,848 (4.2%)   2001 171,533 (30.9%) 
1984 177,248 (14.7%)   1993 174,595 (4.6%)   2002 184,137 (30.4%) 
1985 180,232 (14.3%)   1994 170,865 (0%)     2003 180,830 (32.0%) 
1986 179,147 (10.7%)  1995   55,967 (23.3%)    





earnings allocated but the Bureau of the Census apparently is unable to provide further details.  It 
is a concern that these imputations of earnings do not appear to be random.   
 
Our wage equations typically allow for a lagged dependent variable, wt-1, alongside a set of 
standard variables that include age, gender, schooling, and industry variables.  The equations also 
include year dummies.  Other independent variables are the log of the local unemployment rate, 
union density, and average weekly benefits.  These are all available at the state level.  State union 
density rates by year were obtained from Union Membership and Earnings: Data Book, published 
by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., written by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson (2002), 
and are downloadable at http://www.unionstats.com/.  Average weekly UI benefits data were 
obtained from the Unemployment Insurance Financial Data Handbook published by the U.S. 
Department  of  Labor  Employment  &  Training  Administration.    Data  are  downloadable  at 
http://atlas.doleta.gov/XDMS/indexfrm.xml.    The  most  recently  available  information  on  UI 
benefits is for 2001.   
 
Most states have benefit levels that are intended to replace a little under one half of lost wages. 
However, there are maxima and minima on payments to unemployed individuals, and these are 
the source of much of the state-by-state variation in the data.   
 
The maxima guarantee that many high-wage workers will receive less than half their average lost 
earnings; the minima mean that some low-wage workers earn more than fifty percent of their lost 
wages.  There are considerable differences by state in the benefits maxima.  In 1995, for instance, 
these ranged from a low of $175 per week in Missouri to a high of $362 in New Jersey (O’Leary 
and  Rubin,  1997,  page  174).    The  average  wage  replacement  rate  since  1938  has  been 
approximately 35% (O’Leary and Rubin, 1997).   
 
As an illustration, the Appendix gives data on benefit levels and replacement rates for the year 
2000.  The highest average level of benefits was in Massachusetts ($293) and the lowest in 
Puerto Rico ($104) and Mississippi ($157).  Replacement rates -- defined as the proportion of 
workers’ income replaced by benefits -- were greatest in Hawaii (50%) and lowest in California 
(20%). 
 
5. Results on Hourly and Annual Wages and Earnings 
 
In the US there was an early literature which found evidence of a positive relationship between 
wages and the unemployment rate. This includes papers by Hall (1970, 1972), Reza (1978), 
Behman  (1978),  Roback  (1982),  Adams  (1985),  Marston  (1985)  and  Topel  (1986).   In 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) we showed that such results were sensitive to the inclusion of 
region fixed-effects and to the time period used.   
 
If few or no controls are used, the state-level correlation in the United States between wage levels 
and  unemployment  rates  is  positive.    This  can  be  viewed  as  a  version  of  Harris-Todaro 
compensating differentials.  As an illustration, on the latest US data, and after pooling the years 
1979-2002, we obtain the following simple forms for log hourly earnings equations (where state 





                                                   (1)                   (2)                   (3)       
Log U  +.0333   -.0188   -.0373    
  (2.71)   (2.72)   (1.92)    
LR average Log U      +.1181    
      (4.67)    
State dummies (50)     No     Yes   No    
 
Adjusted R
2  .8529   .9819   .8554    
N    1223       1223   1223    
 
These three equations include a set of year dummies (1979-2002); t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Here  it can be seen that the cross-section correlation between pay and joblessness is indeed 
positive, with an elasticity of 0.0333, when state dummies are omitted (there are no controls in 
this equation: the estimation is simply on year-state cell averages).  Yet, in the spirit of a wage 
curve, the introduction of state dummies, in the second column, overturns the Harris-Todaro 
positive slope.   The gradient changes to -0.0188 with a t-statistic of 2.72.  A similar finding is 
produced  in  the  third  column  where,  instead  of  state  dummies,  the  long-run  average 
unemployment rate over the period (denoted LR average Log U) is entered as a regressor.  There 
is then evidence of both a negative effect from the level of current unemployment and a positive 
effect  from the long run average of unemployment.  These elementary equations are not, of 
course, complete specifications.  They are designed instead to illustrate how a Harris-Todaro 
positive correlation between area unemployment and area wages comes to be reversed.  
 
Table 1 reports wage equations for the states of the US between 1980 and 2001.  Our data set 
provides a sample size of 1122 state-year observations.7  Column 1 of Table 1 is provided as a 
benchmark or extreme.  Year dummies are included.  State dummies are omitted.  This column 1 
specification gives the impression that an approximate Phillips Curve operates: the coefficient on 
lagged wages is 0.955.  In other words, the equation is close to being one that could be rewritten 
with a pure change in log wage as the dependent variable (which would be literally correct if the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable were 1.0).  The control variables in column 1 are 
age, age squared, and the percentage male -- all measured as state averages -- along with twenty 
year-dummies to pick up U.S.-wide changes in the labor market.  A union density variable is also 
included, which enters positively and significantly.    
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that there is a simple regional Phillips Curve in 
these data.  The addition of a set of state fixed-effects and industry controls has a marked effect 
(the industry controls are the proportion of workers in a 2-digit industry in a state-year cell).  As 
can be seen, in column 2 of Table 1, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable drops to 
0.6990.    This  means,  solving  out  for  the  steady-state  level  of  wages,  that  the  long  run 
unemployment  elasticity  of  wages  is  now  estimated  at  -0.08.    This  number  is  obtained  by 
dividing –0.0246 by 1 – 0.6990.   
 
                     





This is evidence of a U.S. wage curve.  At -0.08, its elasticity is the same as in the wage-curve 
literature summarized above.  Nevertheless, Column 2 of Table 1 exhibits a considerable amount 
of autoregression in pay, and Blanchard and Katz (1997) and others make a valuable point in 
drawing attention to some Phillips-like effects in regional wages in the United States.   
 
Although our paper goes on to consider many variations and checks, there is a sense in which the 
main point emerges from this simple comparison of the first two columns of Table 1.  Column 1 
appears to be a Phillips Curve, but is specified too simply.  Column 2, a fuller specification, is 
consistent with the kinds of wage curves that have been found in other countries.  However, 
compared with some nations, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in the U.S. is high.  
 
The level of state unemployment benefit enters positively and significantly in these, and later, 
wage equations.  As far as we are aware, this finding is a new one.  The same result holds true if 
the b variable is entered as a benefit/pay replacement ratio (this ratio can be obtained from the 
same data source and is defined as the average weekly benefits/average weekly wages in the state 
from UI records).  Ideally there should be an instrument for b, but here we have to treat benefits 
as  exogenous.    Table  2’s  second  column  also  finds  that  higher  union  density  in  a  state  is 
associated with higher wages in that state, ceteris paribus.8     
 
Column 3 of Table 1 switches to include the log, rather than the level, of benefits.  The change 
makes little difference.  The size of the effects from benefits in column 3 seems plausible: a 100 
per  cent  increase  in  the  amount  of  benefit  increases  hourly  wages  in  the  long  run  by 
approximately 15 per cent. 
 
In line with the theoretical framework outlined earlier, it is necessary to address the endogeneity 
of wages and unemployment.  Column 4 of Table 1 begins this.  It is estimated by Two Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) and instruments the log of the unemployment rate with one and two lags of 
itself.  Instrumenting produces a noticeable change in the size of the effects.  Comparing Column 
4 to Column 2, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is approximately the same, but 
the coefficient on unemployment has almost doubled in absolute value. As a result, the estimated 
value of the long run unemployment elasticity of pay rises in absolute value to close to -0.16.   
 
Adding in state-specific time trends, as done by Bell, Nickell and Quintini (2002) for Great 
Britain, turns out to reduce the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable still further.  This is 
done in Column 5 of Table 1.  Here, although still statistically well determined, the estimated 
size  of  the  unemployment  elasticity  of  pay  is  only  approximately  -0.03.    However,  no 
instrumenting is done in column 5.  
 
Within Table 1, Columns 6 and 7 provide the fullest specifications.  The unemployment variable 
is  instrumented;  an  unemployment  benefits  measure  is  included  as  an  independent  variable; 
union density is included; there are year dummies, industry controls, state dummies, and state 
time trends.  In both columns, the unemployment elasticity of pay is estimated at approximately -
0.1.    Given  their  completeness,  it  might  be  natural  to  view  these  as  the  most  compelling 
specifications. 
                     






An alternative to estimation with year dummies is to include instead the aggregate wage in the 
United  States  (see  Blanchard  and  Katz,  1999).    This  turns  out  here  to  make  relatively  little 
difference.  Estimates of this kind using the private sector hourly wage of production workers, 
based around a version of Table 1, are given in Appendix 2a using both OLS (column 1) and 
GLS (column 2).   The results are the same.  We also experimented with the private sector 
weekly wage of production workers and obtained similar results.  For completeness, to allow for 
the possibility of endogeneity of the benefits variable, b, columns 3 and 4 in Appendix Table 2a 
report a version of Table 1 with that variable omitted; there is still evidence of a wage curve 
whether OLS or GLS is used (columns 3 and 4 respectively). 
 
How robust is the wage curve? 
 
We now attempt to probe the robustness of the -0.1 finding.   
 
Tables 2 and 3 perform simple experiments.  In each table the sample is first restricted to Right-
to-Work (RTW) and then to non-RTW states.9  In effect, this is a division between states where 
unionism is weak and where it is stronger.  Second, the sample is split into halves, and equation 
estimates are reported separately for the periods 1980-1991 and 1992-2002. Third, education 
controls are added. Table 2 uses OLS; Table 3 instruments the unemployment rate with its first 
two lags.   
 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in Table 2 is lower in RTW states 
than it is in non-RTW states.  This may in part be because union contracts are traditionally for a 
period of two or three years, so in this sector there is automatically a degree of autoregression.  In 
Table 2 the long run unemployment elasticity of wages changes a little: it is –0.05 in Column 1 
and –0.08 in Column 2.  Barth et al (2002a, b) argue that wage flexibility is greater in the non-
union sector in the US.  Indeed, they state that there is no wage curve for their sample of union 
workers.  However, their work had to rely on fairly small cell-sizes in the union sector.  This is 
likely to be a particular problem in the southern RTW states where union membership is low. 
 
Adding education controls -- again these are averages at the state level -- into Table 2 reduces the 
unemployment  elasticity  of  pay  to  a  value  of  –0.04  in  Column  3.    There  is,  however,  no 
completely  consistent  way  to  control  for  educational  levels;  there  was  a  change  in  the  CPS 
education question from 1992. 
 
When the data are divided into two time periods, an interesting outcome is produced.   This 
division is done in Columns 3 to 6 in Table 2.  The lagged dependent variable is found to have a 
markedly smaller coefficient in the second period (that is, for the years 1992-2001) than in the 
first (period 1980-91).  Moreover, in Column 4, the coefficient on the local unemployment rate is 
almost exactly zero.  However, these estimates ignore the potential problem of simultaneity, and 
the statistical significance of the joblessness variable returns when the variable is instrumented.   
 
                     
9  The  Right-To-Work  (RTW)  states  are  Alabama,  Arizona,  Arkansas,  Florida,  Georgia,  Idaho,  Iowa,  Kansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 




Endogeneity of unemployment is allowed for in the columns of Table 3.   Across specifications, 
the long-run unemployment elasticity of the wage curve varies from a low of –0.06 to a high of –
0.14.  The fullest specification, and probably the most reliable, is in Columns 5 and 6.  State time 
trends are included.  So too are year dummies, industry controls, state fixed-effect dummies, and 
in Column 6 of Table 3 also education controls.  In the first period, the unemployment elasticity 
of pay is estimated at -0.07.  In the later period, the elasticity is -0.12.  It seems best simply to 
conclude that these estimates cluster around –0.1. 
      
Table 4 now explores the sensitivity of the results to measurement error by instrumenting the 
lagged dependent variable itself.  The approach follows that of Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002).  
To obtain an instrument, the authors’ paper exploits the fact that the ORG files are obtained 
monthly.   
 
A  suitable  instrument  must  be  correlated  with  lagged  pay  but  uncorrelated  with  the  other 
variables in the wage equation.  Our approach relies on the fact that the data set is collected 
throughout each calendar year.  We create two wage variables.  One averages the pay data in 
even months (i.e., February, April, June and so on).  The other is an average of pay in the odd 
months. This is done to overcome the problem that, as many states have small numbers of CPS 
respondents, estimated wage equations can exhibit errors-in-variables bias.   
 
Staiger et al (2002) split the monthly ORG files into these two independent samples (although 
households  appear  twice  in  the  survey,  the  odd  and  even  months  have  no  households  in 
common). Their innovative suggestion is this:   
 
"Estimates from both the odd and even month samples will be measured with 
error,  but  because  the  samples  are  randomly  drawn,  the  estimation  error  is 
independent in these two samples.  Thus one set of estimates can be used as an 
instrument for the other set of samples." (p.39, 2003).   
 
A  number  of  possibilities  exist,  so  we  go  further  and  obtain  separate  wage  estimates  for 
individuals in the CPS in (a) the odd months, (b) the even months, (c) the first six months, (d) the 
second six months, (e) the first and third quarters, and (f) the second and fourth quarters.  All 
should  be  valid  instruments.    A  further  question  that needs to be addressed is whether it is 
appropriate to instrument the odd months with the even, as Staiger et al (2002) do, or vice versa.  
 
Table 4 presents various specifications.  The most persuasive equations are in part C of the table, 
but  the  others  are  presented  for  completeness.    Table  4  has  three  parts:  the  first,  A,  where 
industry dummies are not included as controls; part B where they are; and part C which includes 
state time trends and industry controls.  Interestingly, the lagged dependent variable has a bigger 
coefficient when the evens are used to instrument the odds than when the reverse is true.  A 
similar picture emerges when the two halves or the quarters are used; the use of past values to 
instrument current values generates a smaller coefficient on the lag on the dependent variable. 
 
Table 4 deliberately presents a battery of estimates to show how the results move away from a 
lagged  dependent  variable  approximately  equal  to  unity.    If  the  past  affects  the  future  only 




cleanest way to do so is to instrument the second six months with the first six months.  Our 
preferred  specification  in  Table  4  is  therefore  row  4  in  part  C  where  the  even  months  are 
instrumented with the odd months.  Here the lagged dependent variable has a coefficient of 0.60 
and the estimated long run unemployment elasticity of wages is approximately -0.075.   
 
Table 5 goes a little further.  It reports results where the lagged dependent variable wt-1 and the 
unemployment rate Ut are both instrumented.  Table 5’s aim is to try to correct, within the same 
estimating  equation,  for  the  endogeneity  of  unemployment  and  measurement  error  in  the 
dependent variable.  In the equations of Table 5, the dependent variable is derived from the 
second  six  months of CPS data, January-June.  Then the lagged dependent variable is itself 
instrumented with the wage derived by averaging data from the first six months, July-December.  
As before, the unemployment rate in time t is instrumented with the unemployment rates at t-1 
and t-2.   
 
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is approximately 0.81 in the first column of 
Table 5.  It has a small standard error, and a (Phillips Curve) null hypothesis of unity is still 
comfortably rejected at normal significance levels. Column 2 of Table 5 adds state time-trends.  
Once this is done, the coefficient on wt-1 drops to approximately 0.71.  As before, there appears 
to be some difference between the right-to-work (RTW) states and the non-RTW states.  The 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are noticeably different between columns 3 and 4 
and 5 and 6.  The addition of state time-trends has a noticeably large impact in the sample of 
RTW  states,  whereas  in  non-RTW  states  the  results  in  columns  5  and  6  are  similar  to  one 
another.  The long run unemployment elasticity of wages is somewhat lower in the RTW states. 
 
Another  experiment  is  to  alter  the  nature  of  the  dependent  variable.    Up  to  this  stage,  the 
estimation in the paper has used data on hourly wages.  It is a matter of judgment whether a pay 
variable is better defined as hourly or annual.  While theoretical economics might favor an hourly 
variable, there are practical disadvantages in empirical work.  Most American workers are not 
paid by the hour and are not aware of their own hourly wage rate but they do know their annual 
pay.  Annual earnings data are reported in the CPS in March of each year.  Annual earnings are 
reported on a worker's W2 form from their employer, which also appears on the individual's tax 
return filed in April of each year.    
 
From  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a), Blanchard and Katz (1997), and Card (1995), it is 
known  that  wage  curves  estimated  with  annual  pay  variables  tend  to  exhibit  relatively  little 
autoregression.    To  explore this in the latest data, Table 6 switches to annual earnings as a 
dependent variable.  The table draws upon data from the Annual Demographic March files of the 
CPS.  These files contain information on each interviewed worker’s earnings in the preceding 
year.  We calculate weighted averages of earnings, using the earnwt variable, and map that to our 
file.  This is done at the level of the state/year cell.  Other control variables, including age, gender 
and industry, are derived from the ORG files and are the same as those used previously in Tables 
2-4.  Data are available on the numbers of weeks worked during the preceding year and the usual 
hours.    In  Table  6,  columns  1-4,  6 and 7 are pay equations estimated for full-time/full-year 
workers, defined as those who worked for 52 weeks and at least 35 hours per week.  In columns 
5 and 8 of Table 6 we impose no such restrictions and use the level of wages in the region.  




California.  Overall, sample sizes are smaller in the March files than in the ORGs; they average 
about 75,000 cases in the former case and 165,000 in the latter.  To deal with the possibility that 
small sample sizes might be responsible for the results, in columns 4 and 5 a set of weighted 
estimates are also given.  These use as weights the cell counts obtained when we averaged.  
Reassuringly, weighting turns out to have a negligible effect. 
 
Table 6’s results are fairly strong.  In all but one column there is a well-determined effect from 
local  unemployment  upon  the  level  of  pay.    The  estimates  of  the  long-run  unemployment 
elasticity in Table 6 are generally consistent with, though a little lower than, those obtained in 
Tables 2-5.  They range here from -0.02 to -0.12.  As in previous research, the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is smaller than in the ORGs.  Including state effects, year effects and 
industry controls, the coefficient on wt-1 is around 0.35.  Adding in state time-trends reduces the 
lagged  coefficient  on  the  wage  still  further,  to  around  0.13,  whether  OLS  or  GLS  is  used.  
Average weekly benefits remain strongly significant at conventional levels, and positive in all 
specifications. 
 
Appendix Table 2b explores a number of other issues.   
 
First, it examines the extent of any bias when estimation does not take account of the fact that a 
significant proportion of wage observations in the ORGs are imputed.  Column 1 of this Table is 
the  equivalent  of  column  2  of  Table  1;  column  2  of  Appendix  Table  2b  takes  the  same 
specification but now includes all observations of the wage, whether imputed or not.  The bias 
from including the imputed observations appears to be miniscule. 
 
Second, we use an alternative estimation method.  Developed by Blanchard and Katz (1997), it 
involves a two-stage procedure.  At the first stage a wage equation is estimated in each year with 
a number of controls included to distinguish differences in worker and workplace characteristics, 
and the coefficients on the state dummy variables are then used at the second stage.  In five of the 
six specifications that Katz and Blanchard (1997) report in their Table 2, they do not include any 
average worker or workplace controls at the second stage; when they do, the size of the lagged 
dependent variable falls from .633 to .258 when the March CPS (1980-1991) is used.   Column 3 
of Appendix Table 2b provides the results using their two-stage procedure with the same set of 
controls as used in column 2 also with the imputed data excluded for the period 1980-2001.  
Now the lag is .744 with industry controls included, and comparable to the result in column 1, 
with a long-run elasticity of -.11.  In column 4, the coefficient on the lagged wage is higher when 
the industry variables are excluded.  Omitting the age and gender variables, in column 5 of 
Appendix Table 2b, has little further impact. 
 
If the sample is restricted to the years 1980-1991 that were available to Blanchard and Katz, and 
we  include  only  non-imputed  data  at  the  first  stage,  and  only  year  and  state  dummies  as 
additional controls at the second stage, we get exactly the result they obtained in column 3 of 
their table.  As can be seen below, the results are different when either more years or more 
controls are added at the second stage or both (controls are as in Appendix Table 2b, column 2). 
 
                 Lagged wage      Log U     Long run elasticity  




1980-1991 no controls  .91  -.04  -0.444 
1980-1991 with controls  .77  -.02  -0.087 
1980-2001 no controls  .88  -.03  -0.250 
1980-2001 with controls  .74  -.03  -0.115 
 
Third, Doug Staiger has suggested to us that if wages genuinely follow a random walk, and there 
are  no  state-level  effects  on  wages  from  variables  like  climate  or  regional  prices,  then  any 
specification with state-specific parameters (e.g. state fixed effects or state time trends) will be 
biased toward finding a wage curve.  An analogy is to running spurious regressions in time series 
analysis.  Supposing that Y follows a random walk:  
 
Yt = Yt-1 + et,  
 
then, if we run the regression,  
 
Yt = b0 + b1Yt-1 + et 
 
the coefficient on b1 is biased downward below 1, and the usual OLS test of b1=1 over-rejects.  
This problem is worse if we include a time trend on the right hand side.  In the state data, the 
analogy is that when we include state dummies or state-specific time trends, the coefficient on 
the lag is biased down.  The size of such bias is uncertain.  Columns 6 and 7 of Appendix Table 
2b are two simple ways of addressing this, but are suggestive only.  Column 6 replaces the state 
fixed-effects with the long-run average of the log unemployment rate for the period 1979-2003, 
while column 7 uses a 19 year moving average of state unemployment rates -- a 19 year average 
is used because we have data back only as far as 1960.  These variables enter positively, as we 
found earlier, suggesting a version of Harris-Todaro compensating differentials.   The lag on the 
dependent  variable  is  now  .839  with  a  long-run  elasticity  of  -.17  and  -.15  respectively.    




Lying  behind  each  of  these  wage  equations  is,  implicitly,  an  unemployment  equation.    As 
explained earlier in the paper, it takes the form Ut = ￿(Ut-1, Ut-2, wt, controls).   
 
The natural justification for this form is to define area unemployment as U = P(wt, controls) – 
N(wt, controls) where P is the participation rate in the area and N is the level of employment 
demand in the area.  We assume the customary AR(2) form of an employment function, and also 
that participation is a non-decreasing function of the wage in the area.  Then the unemployment 
rate in a state, in time period t, is a function of itself lagged twice and of the current wage rate.  
With  these  assumptions,  the  wage  should  enter  positively  in  the  estimated  unemployment 
equation.  The greater is the price of labor, the lower will be the level of labor demand and the 
higher the degree of labor force participation, and so, other factors constant, the higher will be 
the unemployment rate.   
 
In principle the wage variable inside the unemployment equations should be in real rather than 




exist.  However, subject to the assumption that there are not significant variations in the state 
structure of prices, year-dummies can be used as an alternative.    
 
It is useful to study the exact empirical structure of this unemployment equation when fitted to 
US data over the period.  Table 7 does so.  The table models the log of the unemployment rate in 
the state/year cell for the period 1980 to 2002.  This effectively treats US states as a panel.   
 
A central concern of the analysis here is whether well-behaved unemployment equations can be 
estimated once both state fixed-effects and year effects are incorporated.  There appears to have 
been little attempt before in the U.S. literature to estimate such equations.  The well-known paper 
by Blanchard and Katz (1992) on regional evolutions comes close to this, but it focuses primarily 
on employment rather than unemployment data per se.   
 
Table 7 presents a selection of state unemployment equations.  It includes controls for workers’ 
age and its square, gender, the log of hourly and annual pay, and union density in the state.   
 
Extra controls are added as we move across the columns of Table 7.  In later columns, in line 
with the theoretical framework, the level of pay is instrumented using the state benefits level.  
Column 1 contains only year dummies.  The coefficient on the first of the two lagged dependent 
variables is approximately 0.9.  Hourly pay is positive but poorly determined.  Union density has 
no effect.  Column 2 of Table 7 adds state fixed-effects into the specification.  Once this is done, 
the  unemployment  equation  begins  to  take  the  form  that  might  be  expected  from  economic 
theory.  Unemployment is autoregressive: Ut-1 enters with a coefficient of approximately 0.8 and 
Ut-2  with  a  coefficient  of  approximately  -0.08.    Log  hourly  pay  now  has  a  large  and  well-
determined positive coefficient.  The coefficient on union density is positive, although the t-
statistic remains weak. These results are consistent with an inverted labor demand function. 
 
It is natural to examine the implied long run elasticity.  Column 2 of Table 7 can be solved out, in 
the  usual  way,  for  a  steady-state  logarithmic  equation  in  which  the  wage  elasticity  of 
unemployment is approximately 0.6.   
 
Column 3 of Table 7 introduces 44 industry dummies.  The size of the union density effect 
increases and becomes significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  The second lag on 
unemployment loses significance.  As an experiment, column 4 replaces the hourly pay variable 
from the ORGs with the annual pay variable taken from the March CPS data.  The pay variable 
remains significant at the 5% level.   
 
In Table 7, columns 5 through 7, the unemployment equations are estimated with 2SLS.  The pay 
variables are instrumented by the state’s average weekly benefit.  This correction for endogeneity 
has the effect of markedly increasing the coefficient on pay in an unemployment equation.  It also 
reduces the size of the Ut-2 effect.  The coefficient on union density is then poorly determined in 
all later specifications.  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and OECD (1994) have argued that 
high levels of unionization are part of the explanation for differences in unemployment across 
countries.10  Whatever the evidence across countries, it does not seem, controlling for the wage, 
                     




that there is reliable evidence for this claim across the states of the USA.  However, we have not 
attempted to explore the reduced-form effects of unions. 
  
6. Empirical Results on Happiness and Job-Finding 
 
This  section  presents  evidence  that  can  be  viewed  as  complementary  to  the  earlier  wage 
equations.    It  uses  subjective  data  to  explore  how  workers’  wellbeing  and  perceptions  are 
influenced by the local rate of unemployment. 
 
Implicit in the paper’s analytical approach to the labor market are two building blocks.  One is 
the idea that a rise in local unemployment weakens workers’ utility relative to employers’ utility.  
To be more specific, the expected utility level of a worker should, according to the theory, be 
lower  in  areas  where  unemployment  is  high.    The  reason  is  that  in  such  areas  the  typical 
employee is more fearful of job loss.  Such a prediction is captured in the theoretical equation 1 
given  earlier  in  the  paper  (because  the  level  of  expected  utility  is  a  decreasing  function  of 
unemployment, U).  Second, the worker’s perceived chance of finding another job if laid off is, 
according to the theory, a declining function of the local unemployment rate.  In principle, both 
these ideas can be checked empirically.  The problem in practice is the availability of appropriate 
data.   
 
We test these two hypotheses by using information on reported happiness and on workers’ job-
finding perceptions.  We draw upon data from the General Social Survey (GSS) series for the 
United States.  Although still little used by economists, the GSS contains useful data on workers’ 
attitudes and subjective wellbeing.   
 
Happiness data in the GSS are available for most of the years between 1972 and 2002 (there were 
no surveys conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001).  We were able to map 
onto  the  survey  series  the  state/year  unemployment  rates.11    Data  are available in 45 states; 
surveys have not been conducted in 6 small states (Maine, Hawaii, New Mexico, Nebraska, 
Idaho and Nevada).  
 
First, we estimate a series of happiness equations based upon the specifications used -- for a 
different  purpose  --  in  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (2004).    The  specific  focus  here  is  upon 
workers’ subjective wellbeing and on how that is shaped by the state of the local labor market.  
Second,  we  explore  a  variable  measuring  an  individual's  fear  of  unemployment,  and  again 
attempt to see how it is affected by labor-market conditions. 
 
In the GSS, respondents are asked to report their levels of subjective wellbeing.  The question 
asked is: 
 
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days -- would you say that 
you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?   
 
                     
 
11  We are grateful to Tom W. Smith at NORC for giving us permission to use, and providing us with, the state level 




On average, between 1972 and 2002, approximately 32% of respondents said they were very 
happy, 56% were pretty happy, and 12% not too happy.  We treat this as a dependent variable.   
 
The first two columns of Table 8 estimate ordered logit happiness equations for the pooled years 
1972-1998.  State dummies and year dummies are included.  Because of the inclusion of the state 
unemployment rate in an equation estimated at the level of the individual, standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the state level.   
 
For the sake of completeness, the first column of Table 8 estimates a happiness equation for the 
full GSS sample, that is, one including non-workers.  The log of the local unemployment rate 
here enters negatively, with a t-statistic of 1.78.  In other words, Americans who live in a state 
with higher unemployment report lower happiness scores, but this effect is not quite statistically 
significant at the 5% level.   
 
When the sample is restricted to workers, however, in column 2 of Table 8, it can be seen that the 
unemployment effect becomes better determined.  The coefficient is now –0.17 with a t-statistic 
of 2.19.  Although the coefficients in ordered logits are not straightforward to interpret, it can be 
checked that this implies that higher unemployment in the area makes employees systematically 
less likely to report themselves in the two happier categories of the GSS survey responses.  This 
is consistent with the conceptual framework sketched earlier.   
 
In  Table  8,  therefore,  where  pay  is  deliberately  omitted  from  the  equation,  a  higher  local 
unemployment rate is associated with a lower reported level of workers' ‘utility’.  This finding is 
similar to that in country-level data, as discussed in Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) 
and Oswald (1997a).  It also seems consistent with UK results, of a different kind, on ‘fear’ of 
unemployment in Blanchflower (1991). 
 
Column  3  of  Table  8  estimates  an  ordered  logit  where  the  dependent  variable  is  employee 
responses to the following question. 
 
"About how easy would it be for you to find a job with another employer with 
approximately the same income and fringes you now have?  Would you say very 
easy, somewhat easy or not easy at all?" 
 
Responses vary cyclically over time and, consistent with common sense, appear to be negatively 
correlated with the aggregate unemployment rate.    
 
    Not easy       Somewhat easy     Very easy      Unemployment rate (%) 
1977  43  30  27  7.1  
1978  39  33  28  6.1  
1982  53  26  21  9.7  
1983  51  29  19  9.6  
1985  43  32  25  7.2  
1986  39  33  28  7.0  
1988  35  37  28  5.5  




1990  38  30  32  5.6  
1991  40  36  24  6.8  
1993  45  33  22  6.9  
1994  46  33  21  6.1  
1996  40  33  27  5.4  
1998  33  36  31  4.5  
2000  29  33  38  4.0  
2002  36  37  27  5.8  
 
Data on this survey question are available only for the years 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 
1989-1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  The percentage of people saying it would 
be 'very easy' to find a job was highest in 2000, when the US unemployment rate was lowest at 
4%.    Conversely,  the  proportion  saying  it  was  'not  easy'  was  highest  in  1982,  when 
unemployment was at its peak of 9.7%. 
 
Column 3 of Table 8 estimates an ordered logit where the dependent variable is the individual’s 
perception of how easy it would be to find a comparable job elsewhere.  This is a subjective 
variable,  of  course,  but  it  seems  potentially  of  interest.    The  estimated  perceived-chance-of-
finding-a-job equation is an attempt to show how fear of unemployment (or more precisely, the 
local  rate  of  unemployment)  works:  it  influences  workers'  feelings  about  the  probability  of 
finding a new job.  Such a finding is required if the conceptual framework proposed for the wage 
curve is the correct one.  Standard errors are once again adjusted for clustering.  The likelihood-
of-finding-a-job equation captures the subjective probability of getting work and has a negative 
gradient with respect to the state unemployment rate.  With a t-statistic of 4.79, the impact of the 
log of state unemployment in column 3 of Table 8 is a well-determined one.  This finding is 
consistent with one part of the wage-curve framework.   
 
The fact that the log of state unemployment enters significantly and negatively is compatible with 
results in Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) and Schmidt (1999).  A greater rate of joblessness in 
the worker’s region leads, it might be said, to a diminution of that worker’s power relative to the 
firm.  As local unemployment rises, workers become less confident about being able to secure a 
position with another employer. 
 
Although the data used in this section are of a more subjective kind than used by most labor 
economists, they paint a picture that is consistent with the analytical foundations of the wage-
curve.  Unemployment in the local area acts to lower workers’ reported happiness and to reduce 




Economics has few empirical laws.  It is important to know if the wage curve qualifies as one.  
Although evidence for such a curve has been found in more than 40 countries, the existence of a 
wage curve in United States data has been viewed as more controversial.   
 
The estimates in this paper use a longer period of data than has been possible before.  It also 




efficiency-wage framework -- that wages are lower in U.S. states with higher unemployment.  As 
has  been  discovered  in  many  other  nations,  this  wage  curve  has  a  long  run  elasticity  of 
approximately –0.1.   
 
A number of other results emerge.  They are compatible with the theoretical framework proposed 
in the paper.    
 
￿  Wages are greater in states with more generous unemployment benefits.   
 
￿  The higher is the unemployment rate in a state, the lower are the levels of happiness reported 
by workers in that state. 
 
￿  The higher the unemployment rate in a state, the lower is the typical worker’s perceived 
chance of finding a job. 
 
￿  Evidence for the wage curve is particularly strong in non-union (Right-to-Work) states. 
 
￿  Except in isolated specifications, there is not persuasive support for a simple Phillips curve.  
It  seems  more  sensible  to  view  the  data  as  being  characterized  by  dynamic  fluctuations 
around  a  long-run  wage  curve.    State  wages  in  the  United  States  are  autoregressive  (as 
explained in Card and Hyslop, 1997, and Blanchard and Katz, 1997), but not extremely so.  
In many specifications, the coefficient on a lagged dependent variable is 0.5 or smaller. 
 
This  paper’s  results  seem  consistent  with  the  empirical  law  proposed  in  Blanchflower  and 




Table 1.  US State Log Hourly Wage Equations, 1980-2001 
  (1)       (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   (7) 
Log hourly payt-1   .9553   .6990  .6788  .7143    .4921  .5390  .5331 
  (106.88)   (33.61)  (31.98)  (33.56)  (19.09)  (19.51)  (19.12) 
Log unemployment ratet  -.0229   -.0246  -.0245  -.0445  -.0134  -.0418  -.0405 
  (9.97)   (6.50)  (6.56)  (8.01)  (3.37)  (6.55)  (6.37) 
Average weekly benefitt  .00004   .0002    .0002  .0004  .0004   
  (1.30)   (4.03)    (4.69)  (5.46)  (5.90) 
Log weekly benefitt      .0495        .0642 
      (5.70)        (6.12) 
Union densityt  .0004   .0013  .0011  .0015  .0015  .0016   .0016 
  (3.38)   (2.84)  (2.80)  (3.36)  (3.39)  (3.50)  (3.38) 
Constant  -.0303   .0719  -.1498  .3718   .1591  .6137  .0049 
Year dummies  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
Industry controls  No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2SGLS  No   No  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
State time trends  No   No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N  1122   1122  1122  1122  1122  1122  1122 
Within R
2             .9957    .9963  .9964 
Between R
2            .9664    .9055  .9031 
Total R
2    .9953   .9911  .9965  .9906  .9965   .9762  .9765 
F-statistic  8308  2278.63  3301.1     2223.4 
Wald/Chi
2                           1.79e+07                     2.00e+07  2.01e+07 
 
Long run unem. elasticity  -.5123  -.0817  -.0763  -.1558  -.0264  -.0907  -.0867 
 
Notes:  the log of the unemployment rate is instrumented with its 1 year and 2 year lags. All equations also include the averages of age, age squared and gender in each 
state/year cell.   Source: weekly wage benefit amount available from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data Handbook published by the U.S. Department of Labor 
Employment & Training Administration.  Data are downloadable at http://atlas.doleta.gov/XDMS/indexfrm.xml for Handbook 394.   State level union density rates are 
obtained from Union membership and earnings: data book by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson and downloadable at http://www.unionstats.com/.   All other data are 




Table 2.  OLS US State Log Hourly Wage Equations, 1980-2001: Disaggregated by RTW States, Education and Periods 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    
Log hourly payt-1                          .5548  .7014  .5988  .3555  .1992  .0259 
  (14.35)  (24.59)  (18.36)  (8.75)  (4.79)  (0.52) 
Log unemployment ratet    -.0223  -.0240  -.0169  .0010  -.0161  .0110 
  (3.26)  (4.68)  (3.06)  (0.13)  (3.09)  (1.29) 
Average weekly benefitt  .0002  .0002  .0003  .0003  .0006  .0003 
  (3.07)  (3.36)  (3.93)  (3.02)  (4.99)  (2.01) 
Union densityt  .0023  .0011  .0019  .0015  .0016  .0014 
  (3.07)  (1.92)  (3.69)  (1.60)  (3.11)  (1.46) 
   
Constant  -.6479  .2929  -.3785   .9348  -.1369  .6289 
 
Year dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State time trends    Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
RTW state    Yes  No  N/a  N/a  N/a  N/a 
Years of education    No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Education controls    No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
1980-1991    No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
1992-2001    No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
N    484  638  612  510  612  510 
Total R
2    .9967  .9966  .9943  .9923  .9962  .9947 
 
Long run unemployment elasticity  -.0500  -.0804   -.0421  .0016  -.0201  n/a 
 
Notes:   see Table 1.  The Right-To-Work (RTW) states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming and Utah.  For details 




Table 3.  2SLS US State Log Hourly Wage Equations, 1980-2001: Disaggregated by RTW States and Periods 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    
Log hourly payt-1   .4057  .5791  .7407  .3800  .2722  .0999 
  (8.08)  (15.44)  (22.92)  (8.86)  (5.88)  (1.33) 
Log unemployment ratet    -.0549  -.0395  -.0352  -.0351  -.0514  -.1129 
  (3.60)  (4.54)  (3.47)  (2.17)  (5.49)  (1.65) 
Average weekly benefitt  .0004  .0003  .0003  .0003  .0006  .0003 
  (3.25)  (3.77)  (3.32)  (2.74)  (5.35)  (1.82) 
Union densityt  .0027  .0013  .0018  .0012  .0020  .0007 
  (3.37)  (2.03)  (3.41)  (1.24)  (3.68)  (0.54) 
Constant  .2025  .8539  -.6104  1.3940  -.0821  2.8519 
 
Year dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2SGLS    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RTW state    Yes  No  N/a  N/a  N/a  N/a 
State time trends    Yes  Yes  No  No   Yes  Yes 
Years of education    No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Education controls    No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
1980-1991    No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
1992-2002    No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N    484  638  612  510  612  510 
Within R
2    .9969  .9966  .9902  .9841  .9935  .9834 
Between R
2    .7904  .8895  .9425  .8740  .7296  .0944 
Total R
2    .9839  .9763  .9727  .9278  .8970  .1607 
Wald/Chi
2     8.96E+06  1.16e+07  9.30e+06  1.15e+07  1.26e+07  9.57e+06 
Long run unemployment elasticity  -.0924  -.0938  -.1358  -.0566  -.0706  -.1254 
 
Notes:   see Table 1.  The Right-To-Work (RTW) states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming and Utah.  For details see 




Table 4.  Instrumenting the Lagged Dependent Variable: A Selection of Unemployment Elasticities of Pay, 1980-2001.  
 
                  Lagged dep var   Log Unemployment    Weekly Benefits         Union     Long run elasticity 
A)  Without industry controls  
1.  Even instrumented with odd  .9119  -.0294  .00004*  .0009*   -.3337 
2.  Odd instrumented with even  .9487  -.0414  .00005*  .0012  -.8070 
3.  First half instrumented with 2
nd half  .9749  -.0336  .00002*  .0008*  -1.3386 
4.  2
nd half instrumented with 1
st half  .8795  -.0380  .00008*  .0012  -.3154 
5.  Qrtrs 1 & 3 instrumented with qrtrs 2 & 4  .9460  -.0415  .00003*  .0015  -.7685 
6.  Qrtrs 2 & 4 instrumented with qrtrs 1 & 3  .9156  -.0292  .00006*  .0005  -.3460 
 
B)  With industry controls  
1.  Even instrumented with odd  .8228  -.0209  .00006*  .0007*  -.1179 
2.  Odd instrumented with even  .8925  -.0361  .0006*  .0014  -.3358 
3.  First half instrumented with 2
nd half  .9147  -.0235  .0003*  .0007*  -.2755 
4.  2
nd half instrumented with 1
st half  .7896  -.0336  .0001*  .0014  -.1597 
5.  Qrtrs 1 & 3 instrumented with qrtrs 2 & 4  .8935  -.0360  .00006*  .0018  -.3380 
6.  Qrtrs 2 & 4 instrumented with qrtrs 1 & 3  .8374  -.0215  .00005*  .00035*  -.1322 
 
C)  With state time trends and industry controls 
1.  Even instrumented with odd  .6512  -.0149  .0001*  .0012  -.0427 
2.  Odd instrumented with even  .7908  -.0336  .0001*  .0016  -.1606 
3.  First half instrumented with 2
nd half  .8359  -.0202  .00001*  .0010*  -.1231 
4.  2
nd half instrumented with 1
st half  .6081  -.0294  .00007*  .0016  -.0750 
5.  Qrtrs 1 & 3 instrumented with qrtrs 2 & 4   .7927  -.0309  .00003*  .0022  -.1491 
6.  Qrtrs 2 & 4 instrumented with qrtrs 1 & 3  .7120  -.0197  .00004  .0006*  -.0684 
 
*=insignificantly different from zero 
 
Notes: the mean wages were calculated using the earnwt variable and excluding any individual whose earnings were allocated using the I25d variable.  The 
exclusion was not used in 1994 and 1995 as the wage allocation variable I25d is not available in 1994 and for only 1/3





Table 5.  2SLS US State Log Hourly Wage Equations, 1980-2001: Disaggregated by RTW States and Periods (Instrumenting 
Lagged Pay and Unemployment) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    
Log hourly payt-1   .8069  .7071  .6253  .4999  .8274  .8223   
  (21.55)  (11.44)  (8.01)  (4.25)  (15.51)  (8.01) 
Log unemployment ratet    -.0482  -.0573  -.0666  -.0749  -.0426  -.0488 
  (6.20)  (6.42)  (3.49)  (3.22)  (4.28)  (3.71) 
Average weekly benefitt  .0001  .0001  .0002  .0002  .0001  .0001 
  (1.66)  (0.93)  (1.18)  (1.04)  (1.00)  (0.84) 
Union densityt  .0016  .0017  .0035  .0035  .0015  .0015 
  (2.64)  (2.54)  (3.09)  (2.96)  (1.80)  (1.56) 
Constant  .4766  .7657  .3117  .8058  .2973  -.3835 
 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
RTW state  N/a  N/a  Yes  Yes  No  No 
State time trends  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
N  1122  1122  484  484  638  638 
Within R
2    .9910  .9919  .9917  .9924  .9922  .9929 
Between R
2    .9727  .9447  .8105  .6601  .9733  .9200 
Total R
2    .9868  .9815  .9781  .9676  .9877  .9808 
Wald/Chi
2     8.87e+06  8.95e+06  3.74e+06  3.87e+06  5.53e+06  5.70e+06    
 
Long run unemployment elasticity     -0.2496  -0.1956  -0.1777  -0.1498  -0.2468  -0.2746  
 
Notes:   see Table 1.  The Right-To-Work (RTW) states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming and Utah.  For details see 
http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm.  Instruments for the log unemployment rate are one and two lags of itself.  The dependent variable is pay from the second six 




Table 6.  US State Log Annual Pay Equations, 1980-2001 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)   (8)  
Log annual payt-1      .8955  .5059  .3509  .3626  .3466  .3349  .1327  .1374 
  (61.25)  (18.73)  (12.19)  (12.86)  (12.77)  (11.36)  (4.03)  (4.32) 
Log unemployment ratet  -.0131  -.0226  -.0150  -.0181  -.0505  -.0258  -.0266  -.0104 
  (2.69)  (3.26)  (2.09)  (2.64)  (7.56)  (2.49)  (2.17)  (1.36) 
Average weekly benefitt  .0002  .0007  .0006  .0006  .0005  .0006  .0005  .0005 
  (3.71)  (7.89)  (6.11)  (7.29)  (6.56)  (6.35)  (3.92)  (3.91) 
Union densityt  .0005  .0011  -.0006  -.0005  .0008  -.0004  -.0004  -.0006
  (1.97)  (1.36)  (0.77)  (0.70)  (1.08)  (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.6 
Constant  .9933  4.6231  5.6956  5.7507  5.5047  6.3837  8.8832  7.9293 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2SGLS  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
State time trends  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Full-time/full-year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Weighted by cell count  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
   
N  1122  1122  1122  1122  1122  1071  1071  1122 
Within R
2            .9822  .9848    
Between R
2            .7301  .4623    
Total R
2  .9797  .9841  .9867  .9903  .9933  .9369  .9028  .9879 
F-statistic/Wald/Chi
2  1952.0  2067.6  889.6  1254.3  1812.2`   9.13e+07  1.01e+08        
 
LR unempt. elasticity  -.1254  -.0457  -.0231  -.0284  -.0773  -.0388  -.0307   n/s 
 
Notes:  the log of the unemployment rate is instrumented with its 1 year and 2 year lags. All equations also include the averages of age, age squared and gender 
in each state/year cell.   Source: weekly wage benefit amount available from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data Handbook published by the U.S. 
Department of Labor Employment & Training Administration.  Data are downloadable at http://atlas.doleta.gov/XDMS/indexfrm.xml for years up to 1997 and 
subsequently at http://atlas.doleta.gov/XDMS/indexfrm.xml.  State level union density rates are obtained from Union membership and earnings: data book by 
Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson and downloadable at http://www.unionstats.com/.   All other data are weighted averages in each state/year cell obtained 
from the March CPS files 1981-2002.  Data relate to the preceding year so data for 2001 are obtained from the March 2002 Annual Demographic file.   Full-




Table 7.  State Unemployment Equations, USA: 1980-2002.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)     (7) 
Log unemployment ratet-1    .9165  .8127  .7284  .7876  .8087  .7320  .7769 
  (31.26)  (27.59)  (24.37)  (24.20)  (25.03)  (20.76)  (18.48) 
Log unemployment ratet-2    -.0394  -.0758  -.0444  -.0999  .0119  .0545  -.0209 
  (1.35)  (2.51)  (1.45)  (3.06)  (0.33)  (1.31)  (0.47) 
Log hourly payt                  .0445  .4268  .5470    1.5441  2.8158   
  (1.05)  (4.63)  (4.37)    (7.21)  (5.96)   
Union densityt  .0002  .0033  .0055  .0037  -.0011  .0009  .0051   
  (0.23)  (1.47)  (2.15)  (1.36)  (0.43)  (0.27)  (1.48)  
Log annual payt        .1865      2.5194 
        (2.01)      (5.83) 
Constant  .8938  .7313  1.2665  -1.9235  -2.5482  -5.3882  -24.7589 
 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls (44)  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2SGLS  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
N  1172  1172  1172  1071  1121  1121   1071 
Within R
2          .8377  .8341  .7739 
Between R
2          .5677  .3289  .3056 
Total R
2  .8907  .9042  .9150  .9119  .7090  .5467  .5209 
 
 
Notes:   both pay variables are instrumented by the average weekly benefit rate.  Annual wage used relates to full-time/full-year workers.  All equations also 




Table 8.  Happiness Equations and Likelihood-of-Finding-a-Job Equations: USA, 1973-
2002 (ordered logits) 
                         Happiness      Finding a Job   
Age     .0107  -.0078  -.0306   
  (2.14)  (1.01)  (3.40)   
Age squared  -.0001  .0002  .0001   
  (0.94)  (2.24)  (0.49)   
Male  -.0156  -.0454  .0045   
  (0.66)  (1.89)  (0.15)   
Part-time  -.0552  -.1007  .3363   
  (1.47)  (2.61)  (7.32)   
Temporarily not working  -.2441  -.2798  -.0433   
  (3.50)  (3.82)  (0.59)   
Black   -.6356  -.6399  -.2223   
  (19.45)  (14.77)  (4.12)   
Other non-white   -.1096  -.0984  -.1184   
  (2.20)  (1.64)  (1.64)   
Years of Schooling   .0585  .0538  .0759   
  (13.14)  (11.49)  (11.73)   
Log state unemployment   -.1427  -.1754  -.7770   
  (1.78)  (2.19)  (4.79)   
 
Workers only  No  Yes  Yes   
 
Cut_1   -1.6354  -2.3223  -1.8992     
Cut_2   1.2110  .7193  -.4370     
 
Pseudo R
2   .0209  .0152  .0353   
Log pseudo likelihood  -36893.9  -22092.6  -14678.8     
N   39,998  24,725  14,032       
 
Notes: The probability-of-finding-a-job variable is available for years 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 
1985, 1986, 1989-1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  All equations include 44 state 
dummies and also year dummies (21 for happiness and 15 for job-finding).  Happiness equations 
also include 4 marital status dummies, and a dummy for parents divorced when respondent age 
16, as in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).  Column 1 also includes dummies for unemployment, 
housework, student and retired.  t-statistics, in parentheses, are adjusted for state level clustering.  
Excluded category: full-time and white.   
 




Appendix Table 1a.  Average weekly benefits by state, 2000 
 
  Average                  % average  
  Weekly                       weekly 
  Benefit                         wage 
Alabama   $159.41    .290 
Alaska   $189.86   .288 
Arizona   $162.51   .261 
Arkansas   $210.08   .420 
California   $160.00   .203 
Colorado   $255.86   .360 
Connecticut   $257.56   .294 
Delaware   $214.85   .306 
District of Columbia   $241.03   .252 
Florida   $220.21   .378 
Georgia   $211.89   .324 
Hawaii   $283.67   .496 
Idaho   $209.46   .398 
Illinois   $251.58   .345 
Indiana   $222.19   .374 
Iowa   $238.42   .447 
Kansas   $247.09   .442 
Kentucky   $224.78   .409 
Louisiana   $182.06   .343 
Maine   $202.29   .386 
Maryland   $212.51   .312 
Massachusetts   $293.45   .344 
Michigan   $244.12   .344 
Minnesota   $290.51   .428 
Mississippi   $156.62   .328 
Missouri   $186.22   .311 
Montana   $187.92   .414 
Nebraska   $188.00   .356 
Nevada   $222.43   .361 
New Hampshire   $217.21   .327 
New Jersey   $289.61   .345 
New Mexico   $180.43   .349 
New York   $247.48   .286 
North Carolina   $231.21   .389 
North Dakota   $210.01   .448 
Ohio   $236.40   .381 
Oklahoma   $214.40   .422 
Oregon   $232.62   .372 
Pennsylvania   $264.76   .407 
Puerto Rico   $103.91   .293 




South Carolina   $190.18   .354 
South Dakota   $180.86   .386 
Tennessee   $188.74   .325 
Texas   $227.11   .340 
Utah   $213.89   .386 
Vermont   $215.55   .391 
Virginia   $203.88   .308 
Virgin Islands   $198.07   .379 
Washington   $280.94   .396 
West Virginia   $197.53   .390 
Wisconsin   $233.11   .396 
Wyoming   $207.10   .408 
 




Appendix Table 2a.  US State Log Hourly Wage Equations with Aggregate Wage Included or Average Benefits Excluded, 1980-2001 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)  (4) 
Log hourly payt-1   .6806  .7156  .7257  .7473 
   (34.33)  (33.72)  (36.53)  (36.34) 
Log unemployment ratet   -.0206  -.0441  -.0224  -.0429 
   (6.15)  (8.21)  (5.93)  (7.74) 
Average weekly benefitt  .0002  .0003       
   (4.31)  (5.16)   
Union densityt  .0014  .0018    .0010  .0012 
  (3.23)  (4.00)    (2.39)  (2.87) 
National waget  .2683  .2152   
   (11.44)  (8.38) 
Constant  -.7890   -.4876    .0904  .2413 
 
Year dummies   No    No    Yes  Yes 
Industry controls   Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects   Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes 
2SGLS   No    Yes    No  Yes 
State time trends   No    No    No  No 
 
N  1122        1122      1122  1122 
Within R
2          .9951    .9956 
Between R
2          .9655    .9614 
Total R
2  .9961
    .9904  .9964  .9897 
F-statistic  4113.6              3244.2 
Wald/Chi
2     1.61e+07  1.76e+07 
 
Long run unemp. elasticity   -.0645      -.1551    -.0816  -.1698 
 
Notes: controls are as in Table 1.  National wage is defined as the average hourly wage of private sector production workers in 




Appendix Table 2b.  US State Log Hourly Wage Equations Using 2 Stage Procedure and Long-Run Average Unemployment, 1980-2001 
 
                                                    (1)                   (2)                  (3)   (4)                    (5)  (6)                     (7)     
Log hourly payt-1    .6990  .7083   .7437  .8309  .8369  .8394  .8392 
   (33.61)  (34.37)  (37.92)  (53.46)  (54.97)  (59.09)  (58.78) 
Log unemployment ratet   -.0246  -.0244  -.0285  -.0349  -.0349  -.0273  -.0246 
   (6.50)  (6.49)  (8.58)  (12.21)  (12.24)  (7.59)  (7.46) 
Average weekly benefitt   .0002  .0002  .0001  .0002  .0002  .0001  .0001 
   (4.03)  (3.66)  (3.14)  (4.39)  (4.48)  (3.85)  (3.96) 
Union densityt   .0013  .0012  .0010  .0009  .0009  .0009  .0009 
   (2.84)  (2.94)  (2.64)  (3.00)  (2.72)  (4.74)  (4.64) 
Average Log unempt.             +.0170 
            (2.68) 
19yr Moving avge Log unempt.            +.0103 
              (2.02) 
Constant   .0719  -.0307  .1504  .3934  .0377  -.1034  -.1708 
   
Including imputations  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
2 stage procedure  No   No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Year dummies  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls   Yes   Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Personal averages  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects   Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No   
2SGLS   No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
N   1122  1122  1122  1122  1122  1122  1122 
R
2   .9911  .9964  .9834  .9806  .9817  .9961  .9961 
F-statistic  2278.63  3179.8  174.3  433.4  479.8  3590.4  3579.9 
 
Long run unempt. elasticity  -.0817  -.0836  -.1112  -.2064  -.2140  -.1700  -.1530 
 
Notes: controls are as in Table 1.  Column 1 is from Table 1 column 2.  Two-stage procedure involves running a first stage regression 
and extracting the mean wage residual (coefficient on the state dummy variable).  Controls at the first stage for 1979-1991 are age 
and its square, gender, years of education, 4 race dummies and 45 industry dummies.  After 1991, years of education is replaced with 
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